Room 6C/6E Group Decision And Voting Power

Friday, October 12, 2012: 8:00 PM
6C/6E (WSCC)
Juliette Guemmegne Tayou, MA , The department of Economics, The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM
Roland Pongou , The department of Economics, The university of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada
The dimension theory has been introduced in the literature to address three limitations of the  formal definition of yes-no voting rule: the non-specification of the latent chambers where the decision takes place,  the absence of the  relative power of the different   stakeholders in the decision process, the lack of measure of the complexity of the decision rule.  This paper extends the dimension theory to a class of game that gives more flexibility to individuals in the expression of their view.  Rather than considering Yes-no voting rules, we  account for qualitative and quantitative scaling of the proposal at stake such as  the  one to ten voting scaling, the Likert scaling. We provide some application to real world group decisions.