Investigating the Feasibility of Near Field Communication Vulnerabilities

Near Field Communication (NFC) is currently at the forefront of a new era of payment transaction.  Smart phone devices are now being fitted with this hardware to allow for an easier method of payment for goods.  The fact that this technology functions through a radio frequency, though, opens the possibility for eavesdropping and intrusion.  This poster will discuss the feasibility of such an attack and its practicality.  We will attempt to find and expose vulnerabilities within NFC in an effort to strengthen its concept and allow for a more secure transaction between wireless devices.  Our research will involve working with the latest smart phones on the market equipped with NFC to determine if it is possible to intercept incoming transactions and reroute its information to a third party device.  Investigations will also be made as to whether it is feasible to activate a passive NFC device and begin stealing information without the user’s knowledge.  If an intrusion attack does indeed turn out to be feasible, we will begin exploring the encryption algorithm between transmissions and assess its security status.